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Kant, Habermas and Democratic Peace
RobertJ. Delahunty* and John Yoo**
Philosophers of great stature rarely write about international law or
international relations. When they do, their writing, though often illuminating,
tends to be brief, episodic and marginal to the rest of their work. We owe a fine
essay on the balance of power to David Hume;' two short but fascinating essays
2on peace to Jean-Jacques Rousseau; and an essay on treaties and another on
intervention to John Stuart Mill.3 But no one could claim that these essentially
minor works are central to the thought of those philosophers. One notable,
recent exception to this generalization is John Rawls Law of Peoples (2001). Two
other major exceptions should be mentioned. The first of these is the towering
eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinker Immanuel Kant. The other is the
contemporary German thinker Jiirgen Habermas, much of whose highly
influential work is devoted to international affairs. In this Article, we shall be
examining the ideas of Kant and Habermas, especially as reflected in Habermas'
long essay, The Kantian Project and the Divided West, published in an English
* Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Professor of Law, University of California Berkeley School of Law; Visiting Scholar, American
Enterprise Institute. The authors thank Janet Galeria for excellent research assistance.
I David Hume, Ofthe Balance of Power in Essays Moral, Political, Literary (Liberty Fund 1987) (arguing
that the concept of a "balance of power" is not modem but is rooted in the practices of the
ancient world).
2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The State of War, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Lasting Peace Through the
Federation of Europe and The State of War (Constable and Co 1917) (C.E. Vaughan, trans); Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A
Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe and The State of War (Constable and Co 1917) (C.E.
Vaughan, trans); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Jugement sur la Paix Peipetuelle, in Charles Edwyn Vaughan,
ed, 1 The Political Writings ofJean Jacques Rousseau (Cambridge 1915).
3 John Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention, in John M. Robson, ed, 21 The Collected Works of
John Stuart Mill: Essays on Equality, Law, and Education (Routledge 1984); John Stuart Mill, Treaoy
Obligations, in John M. Robson, ed, 21 The Collected Works ofJohn Stuart Mill Essays on Equalit; Law,
and Education (Routledge 1984).
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translation in The Divided West.4 The relationship between Kant and Habermas,
both in that essay and throughout Habermas' work, is an extremely close one,
and few later thinkers have done as much as Habermas to demonstrate the
continuing importance and relevance of Kant's political thought for the
contemporary world.
Briefly stated, our argument is this: two characteristically Kantian theses
need to be distinguished. The first thesis we call the idea of "world federalism,"
in other words the creation of some form of global governance structures as a
solution to the problem of war. The second thesis is what has come to be called
the "democratic peace." The first idea envisages the creation of a "cosmopolitan
constitution," or a set of legal and political arrangements on a global scale that
would entrench peace between and within states, partly through extending world
citizenship and human rights protections to all human beings. A "cosmopolitan
constitution," in both Kant's and Habermas' view, does not necessarily require
the emergence of a unitary world state or global empire. Both thinkers argue that
a cosmopolitan constitution could instead be realized through some form of
legalized and institutionalized associations among states that are sturdier and
more binding than traditional defensive alliances and trade pacts, but that do not
involve the complete submergence of those states in a larger political union. For
Kant, the then-new federal system of the US provided one model, on a local
scale, for a cosmopolitan constitution; for Habermas, the EU may do the same.
Kant also discovered what later expositors have come to call the
"democratic peace thesis." That thesis has two sides, one empirical and the other
theoretical. As explained by the political scientist Michael Doyle (whose seminal
1983 work Kant, Liberal Legades, and Foreign Affairs5 provoked extensive
discussion of the democratic peace thesis), the empirical claim is that "[e]ven
though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal
states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one
another."6 The theoretical claim is, in brief, that "democracies have unique
'contracting advantages,' which allow them to build stable, peaceful relations,
based on multiple self-enforcing bargains." 7 Although not without its critics,8
the empirical side of the democratic peace thesis appears to be well established.
4 Jijrgen Habermas, The Divided West 113 (Polity Press 2006) (Ciaran Cronin, trans).
5 Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-
Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds, Debating the Democratic Peace 3 (MIT 2001).
6 Id at 10.
7 Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace 1 (Princeton 2003).
8 See, for example, Joanne Gowa, Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace (Princeton 1999)
(arguing that "democratic peace" is not a result of common polities, but rather a product of the
shifting-interest patterns after the Cold War).
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On the theoretical side, the thesis draws strength from its close links to the
"rationalist" theory of war, which has so far proven to be perhaps the most
plausible general account of the origins of major war.9 The democratic peace
thesis does not hold that democracies do not fight wars with non-democracies;
on the contrary, there is abundant evidence not only that they do fight such
wars, but also that their democratic constitutions give them certain advantages in
such contests.' ° Nor does the democratic peace thesis hold that new and
immature democracies do not fight each other. However, there is also
substantial evidence that, at least after the Second World War, democracies have
been far less likely to initiate aggressive war than non-democracies." Supporters
of the democratic peace thesis often believe that the surest and best method of
securing global peace, protecting human rights and reducing the incidence of
mass atrocities is to promote democracy successfully throughout the world.' 2
Consistent with that belief, democracy-promotion has been a fundamental
American policy objective for many decades, in both Republican and
Democratic administrations. 3 The US undoubtedly has been encouraged in that
effort by its remarkable successes after the Second World War in transforming
Germany, Italy and Japan into stable, peaceful, democratic allies and trading
partners. 14 Democracy-promotion was undoubtedly a significant motive for
9 For the classic statement of that theory, see James D. Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49
Ind Org 379 (1995). Fearon's work has recently been deepened and extended by R. Harrison
Wagner, War and the State: The Theogy of International Politics (Michigan 2007) (discussing ideas about
the relationship between organized violence and political order at the global level through the lens
of Realism). A major alternative to the rationalist theory of war is found in Richard Ned Lebow,
A Cultural Theoy of International Relations (Cambridge 2008) (discussing international relations
though the Greek idea that spirit, appetite, and reason are fundamental human drives) and
Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (Cambridge 2003)
(offering Thucydidean "constructivist" account of international politics).
10 See Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton 2002). Conversely, in some
conflicts, their democratic constitutions and practices can also create strategic liabilities for states.
See Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria,
Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge 2003).
1" See J ohn Norton Moore, Solving the War PuZZle: Begond the Democratic Peace 13-25 (Carolina 2004).
12 For example, Daniel Goldhagen has recently argued that non-democratic rbgimes today "have a
built-in propensity-a real one, and not just a hypothetical one-to adopt eliminationist policies,
including their lethal variant." Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism
and the Ongoing Assault on Humanio 280 (Public Affairs 2009); see also id at 592-97.
13 See G. John Ikenberry, America's Liberal Grand Strategy: Democray and National Security in the Post-war
Era, in Michael Cox, John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, eds, American Democrafy Promotion:
Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts 103, 124--26 (Oxford 2000).
14 This is not to say that democracy usually can or should be imposed by military intervention. The
economist Christopher Coyne has studied US attempts since 1898 to impose democracy after
military intervention. See Christopher J. Coyne, After War The Political Economy of Exporting
Democracy (Stanford 2007). Coyne found a success rate of only 28 percent after five years and of
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several recent American military interventions abroad, including those in
Panama (1989), Haiti (1994) and Iraq (2003).
Our core claim, then, is this: Habermas conceives the "Kantian project" to
be one of securing global peace and upholding basic human rights through
strengthening and expanding supranational and transnational institutions. In
substance, he is offering a kind of Kantian world federalism as the way forward
for the global community of states. We consider that approach fundamentally
mistaken. In our view, democracy-promotion is clearly the better path. It
recognizes the necessity and desirability of a plurality of independent nation
states. It is more protective of both the freedom of individuals and the cultural
identities of peoples. It is far more likely to yield a durable global peace. And it
can form the basis of a foreign policy that serves the national security interests
of the US and its leading allies.
In Section I, we begin by outlining Immanuel Kant's views on war and
peace. In Section II, we set forth and criticize Habermas' version of the
"Kantian project." In Section III, we explain the democratic peace thesis more
fully and argue that democracy-promotion will not only tend to promote global
peace and respect for human rights, but will serve the national security interests
of the world's leading democratic powers by doing so.
I. KANT ON WAR AND PEACE
In order to understand Habermas' position, we will need at least a
rudimentary grasp of the thinking of Immanuel Kant on war and peace. So let us
start with a reprise of Kant's ideas on that subject.
A. KANT ON WAR AND ITS REMEDIES
Kant assumes that war-even the "limited" kind of war characteristic of
eighteenth-century Europe before the French Revolution -is a very great evil.
only 36 percent after twenty years. Id at 15-16. Moreover, the most significant successes of
coerced democratization were the post-Second World War cases of Nazi Germany and Austria,
Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan-where traces of pre-War liberalism had not been wholly effaced,
and where the American military victories had been absolute. In general, Coyne found that
"political, economic, and social change that is imposed at the point of a gun is more likely to be
met with resistance and is less likely to 'stick' once occupiers exit the country." Id at 28.
15 On the changes in the nature of warfare introduced by the French Revolution, see David A. Bell,
The First Total War Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It (Houghton Mifflin
2007). See also Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century 19-41 (Indiana
1984); Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War 40-41 (George Allen & Unwin 1983);
J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961 at 26-41 (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1961); Paul W.
Schroeder, Napoleon's Foreign Poly: A Criminal Enterprise, 54 J Mi! Hist 147 (1990). Undoubtedly,
eighteenth-century European warfare was "limited" by comparison with both the religious wars
of the seventeenth century and the popular-nationalist wars of the French Revolution and its
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In his fascinating reflections on the Book of Genesis, originally published in
1786 as Conjectures on the Beginning of Human Histogy, he wrote:
I]he greatest evils which oppress civilized nations are the result of war-
not so much of actual wars in the past or present as of the unremitting,
indeed ever-increasing preparation for war in the future. All the resources of
the state, and all the fruits of its culture which might be used to enhance
that culture even further, are devoted to this purpose. Freedom suffers
greatly in numerous areas, and the state's maternal care for its individual
members is replaced by demands of implacable harshness (even if this
harshness is justified by fear of external threats). 16
Kant's account could hardly be improved upon as a description of his native
Prussia, which throughout his lifetime was effectively "an army with a State ...
rather than a State with an army."17
What remedy exists for this condition?"8 Kant considered, but emphatically
ruled out, the possibility of a world state-a single, planctary government to
which all of humanity would be subject. For Kant (as for other eighteenth-
century thinkers such as the historian Edward Gibbon), even if a world state
brought enduring peace, it would also spell the end of freedom.' 9 Kant
compared such a world state to the Empire of China, which for him was a
aftermath. See Michael Sheehan, Balance of Power: History & Theogy 99-105 (Rutledge 1996).
However, the extent to which eighteenth-century warfare in Europe was "limited" should not be
overstated. See Jeremy Black, Warfare in the Eihteenth Century 173-77 (Harper 2002).
16 Immanuel Kant, Conjectures on the Beginning of Human Histoy, in Hans Reiss, ed, Kant: Political
Writings at 221, 231-232 (Cambridge 2d ed 1991) (H.B. Nisbet, trans). See also Immanuel Kant,
On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, but it does not Appy in Practice,'in Reiss, ed, Kant:
Political Writings 61, 91-2. ("Nowhere does human nature appear less admirable than in the
relationships which exist between peoples. No state is for a moment secure from the others in its
independence and its possessions. The will to subjugate the others or to grow at their expense is
always present, and the production of armaments for defense, which often makes peace more
oppressive and more destructive of internal welfare than war itself, can never be relaxed.").
17 Geoffrey Best, War and Societ in Revolutionagy Europe 1770-1870 at 37 (St Martin's 1982). Kant was
right to emphasize the crippling financial burdens that eighteenth-century warfare imposed. The
Hapsburg Empire's war with Turkey had "nearly bankrupted" it; France "was bankrupted by its
semi-victory over Britain" in the American Revolutionary War; and Britain had expended the
colossal sum "at least C 110 million" in fighting that war. Id at 29-30. Kant had seen the effects
of the Seven Years' War at first hand: his native city of K6nigsberg was occupied by Russian
forces from 1756 to 1763. See Elizabeth York, Leagues of Nations: Andent, Medieval, and Modern 264
(Swarthmore 1919).
18 For surveys of pre-Kantian approaches, see Sylvester John Hemleben, Plans for World Peace Through
Six Centuries 42-82 (Chicago 1943); Walter Alison Phillips, The Confederation of Europe: A Study of the
European Alliance, 1813-1823 as an Experiment in the International Organization of Peace 18-31 (Howard
Fertig 1966 reprint of 2d ed 1920).
19 Compare Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Ch 3 35 (Fred de Fau and Co
1906) ("The division of Europe into a number of independent states, connected, however, with
each other, by the general resemblance of religion, language, and manners, is productive of the
most beneficial consequences to the liberty of mankind.").
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paradigm of political despotism: "[w]e need only look at China, whose position
may expose it to occasional unforeseen incursions but not to attack by a
powerful enemy, and we shall find that, for this very reason, it has been stripped
of every vestige of freedom."2 That form of world state, therefore, is not the
solution to the problem of war.
Equally, Kant rejected the common eighteenth-century idea that "a so-
called European balance of power" could bring permanent, universal peace.
That notion, he said, was "a pure illusion., 2' Kant was right. Recent studies
suggest that the predatory balance of power system that prevailed in Europe for
most of the eighteenth century was far more violent and war-prone than the
"concert" system that superseded it after the defeat of Napoleon and the great
settlement of 1815.22 As one scholar of the period has written, "[b]alance-of-
power politics-the politics of confrontation-generated intolerable
20 Kant, Conjectures on the Beginning of Human Histoa at 232 (cited in note 16). For a brief discussion of
eighteenth-century European misconceptions of China (of which Kant's was typical), see John
Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of GlobalEmpires 1400-2000 131-32 (Bloomsburg 2008).
21 See Kant, On the Common Saying at 92 (cited in note 16). Beginning as early as the fifteenth century,
European statesmen and diplomats had begun to think in terms of a "balance of power" by
means of which peace was to be maintained and one state was to be prevented from dominating
others. By 1612, the renowned international lawyer Alberto Gentili was arguing in his DeJure Be/li
Libri Tres that the European states were justified in resisting the claims of the Spain on the one
side and the Ottoman Empire on the other to universal dominion. Reflection on and theorization
of the balance of power were brought to new heights in the eighteenth century, and the policy of
maintaining the balance "appeared to many observers as something with moral justification of its
own, almost independent of any practical value it might have." See M.S. Anderson, The Rise of
Modern Diplomay 1450-1919 165 (Longman 1993); consider, id at 150-66 (tracing evolution of the
doctrine). For example, Emmerich de Vattel, one of the eighteenth century's leading authorities
on international law, viewed the balance of power, not only as protecting both liberty and
stability, but also as causing Europe as a whole to become a kind of republic of its own. See
Nicholas G. Onuf, The Republican Legag in International Thought 102-03 (Cambridge 1998). Even in
its heyday in the eighteenth century, however, the balance of power had severe critics. See
Sheehan, Balance of Power at 103 (cited in note 15) (quoting views of British parliamentarian
William Wyndham); see also Robert J. Delahunty, Herbert Butterjield, Chrislianio, and International
Law, 86 U Detroit Mercy L Rev 615, 645-46 (2009) (discussing eighteenth -century balance of
power theory).
22 See, for example, Paul W. Schroeder, The 19th Centuy International System: Changes in the Structure, 39
World Pol 1, 2, 10-11 (1986) (arguing that nineteenth-century international peace derived mainly
from systemic change, reflected in institutional arrangements that differed from the eighteenth-
century norm); Paul W. Schroeder, The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political
Equilibrium?, 15 Rev Intl Pol 135, 141-42 (1989) (discussing the significance of the balance of
power idea in European political and social life); Paul W. Schroeder, Did the Vienna Settlement Rest
on a Balance of Power?, 97 Am Hist Rev 683, 684-90, 694, 696, 701-02 (1992) (discussing how the
balance of power influenced the Vienna Settlement); Robert Jervis, From Balance to Concert: A Study
of InternalionalSecurio Cooperation, 38 World Pol 58 (1985) (discussing the concert system in place
from 1815 to 1854); Robert Jervis, A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and Concert, 97
Am Hist Rev 716, 718-23 (1992) (analyzing the balance of power idea and its impact on the
frequency of war).
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international tensions, produced increasingly serious armed conflicts, and
inspired progressively extravagant plans of aggression. It neither maintained
peace nor preserved the independence of sovereign states; by the time of the
French Revolution, the international system had broken down altogether."23
Leading European statesmen who had witnessed the transformation, including
Friedrich Gentz and Friedrich Arcillon, also recognized the fundamental
difference between the pre-Revolutionary balance of power system and the
Concert of Europe that supplanted it after 1815.24 As the historian Paul
Schroeder pungently expressed, after the Napoleonic wars "European statesmen
had learned that eighteenth-century poker led to Russian roulette and decided to
play contract bridge instead. 25
What then was Kant's solution to the problem of war? His initial answer
depended on drawing an analogy between individual human beings and
households in the pre-political "state of nature" and organized states in the
condition of international anarchy.26 In his 1793 essay On the Common Saying:
This May be True in Theory, but it does not Appy in Pracice,'he argued that just as
the widespread private violence and pervasive insecurity that are endemic to the
state of nature force individuals into an organized political and legal system-"a
23 Richard B. Elrod, The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System, 28 World Pol 159,
161-62 (1976); see also Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, Force, Order, and Justice 102-04
(Johns Hopkins 1967).
24 See Carsten Holbrand, The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British International Theogy 1815-
1914 17-18 (Longman 1970) (quoting views of leading publicist Friedrich Gentz in 1818 on the
significant differences between the pre-Revolutionary balance of power and the post-war
Congress system); id at 36-37 (discussing the view of Friedrich Ancillon, writer, royal tutor and
later Foreign Minister of Prussia, on the merits of Congress system as opposed to pre-
Revolutionary balance of power). From its origin in Clause Six of the Quadruple Alliance of the
November 20, 1815, it was understood and expected that the Congress system would mark an
unprecedented departure in European diplomatic practice. See Quadnple Alliance of November 20,
1815 in Sir Charles Webster, 2 The Foreign Polie of Castlereagh 1815-1822 55-57 (G. Bell and Sons
1963); Henry Kissinger, A World Restored 215 (Houghton Mifflin 1957). Scholars disagree over
exactly how and why the "Congress" system differed from the earlier balance of power. For the
argument that the master concept of the Congress system was the "Great Power principle," see
Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of
International Stability 232-47 (Oxford 1994). In any event, the Concert's mechanisms were
operating, albeit feebly, as late as 1912-13. See Richard Langhorne, The Collapse of the Concert of
Europe: International Politics 1890-1914 at 4 (1981).
25 Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert
404 (Cornell 1972); consider id at 401-07 (describing principles that underlay the Concert
system).
26 See Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf, Justice Among Nations.- On the Moral Basis of Power
and Peace 196-99 (Kansas 1999).
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civil constitution"-so the pressures of interstate war and competition must
ineluctably lead states to form a "cosmopolitan constitution. 27
But what is a "cosmopolitan constitution?" Kant noted that "such a state
of universal peace" under a cosmopolitan constitution "is in turn even more
dangerous [than interstate warfare] to freedom, for it may lead to the most
fearful despotism (as has indeed occurred more than once with states which
have grown too large)." 28 Instead, "distress must force men to form a state
which is not a cosmopolitan commonwealth under a single ruler, but a lawful
federation under a commonly accepted international right. ' 29 In the end, he
maintained, the problem of war could not be solved except through "a state of
international right, based upon enforceable public laws to which each state must
submit (by analogy with a state of civil or political right among individual
men) .... [W]e should proceed in our disputes in such a way that a universal
federal state may be inaugurated."3 °
Kant returned to the problem of war in his 1797 work, The Metaphysics of
Morals. There, as before, he argued that "the state of nature among nations (as
among individual human beings) is a state which one ought to abandon in order
to enter a state governed by law."'" International law in its current form can
establish peace between nations, but it does so only on a provisional basis
because it does not end the condition of international anarchy. The moral
imperative to create a permanent peace could only be satisfied, Kant argued, by
"a universal union of states (analogous to the union through which a nation
becomes a state)." 32 A cosmopolitan constitution creating such a union, unlike
the prevailing public international law, would have a peremptory validity, rather
than being merely provisional. The peace that it would establish would be a true
and lasting peace, not an ephemeral one.33 But at this point, Kant surfaced a
conflict that had been latent in his thought. This union of states seemingly could
not take the form of a single supra-state that dissolved the identities of its
member states. Kant based that conclusion not on the threat to freedom that a
supra-state would pose, but rather on the consideration that as the territory of a
supra-state grows ever larger, "it will eventually become impossible to govern it
27 Kant, On the Common Saying at 90 (cited in note 16).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id at 92.
31 Kant: Political Writings 131, 171 (cited in note 16).
32 Id at 171.
33 See Jiirgen Habermas, Human Rights, International Law, and the Global Order Cosmopolitanism Two
Hundred Years Later, in James Boham and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, eds, Perpetual Peace: Essays on
Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal 113, 116 (MIT 1997).
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and thence to protect each of its members," leading back again to the state of
war. 34
Instead, Kant suggested that a union of several states meant to preserve
peace might take the form of "a permanent congress of states," like the assembly
of European powers that had met periodically at The Hague from the late
seventeenth century through the early eighteenth century. Although the work of
this assembly resulted in several major treaties, including the Treaty of the Triple
Alliance (1688), the Concert of the Hague (1710) and the Treaty of Peace
between Spain, Savoy and Austria (1717), and although the governments
concerned came to think of "all Europe as a single federated state, which they
accepted as an arbiter in all their public disputes,"3 the Hague system proved to
be short-lived. In the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) and the Seven
Years' War (1754-63), Europe returned to its violent ways. As Kant's
Jit-Jacquus oj jutt it, iwas once again sadly true that
"the state peculiar to the Powers of Europe is simply a state of war., 36 The
solution to the problem of war thus required avoiding both too highly
centralized and consolidated a union of states and a system so loose that it
amounted to little more than an alliance that could be dissolved at any time at
the behest of any of its members. Kant suggestively (but without giving detail)
proposed that the proper model would be "an association which, like that of the
American states, is based on a political constitution and is therefore indissoluble.
For this is the only means of realizing the idea of public international right as it
ought to be instituted, thereby enabling the nations to settle their disputes in a
civilized manner by legal proceedings, not... by acts of war."37
B. KANT'S "PERPETUAL PEACE"
Kant's Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch is probably his most widely read
and influential work on international law and relations. It was originally
published in 1795, between the 1793 essay On the Common Sajing, and The
Metaphjsic of Morals in 1797. In Perpetual Peace, Kant sketched out a solution to the
problem of war that marks a real advance over his other formulations-a
34 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals in Hans Reiss, ed, Kant: Political Writings 171 (Cambridge
2d ed 1991) (H.B. Nisbet, trans).
35 Id. For the early eighteenth-century conception of Europe as a kind of unitary system with
identifiable interests of its own, distinct from those of particular European states, see Osiander,
The States System ofEurope 110-17 (cited in note 24).
36 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Extrait d projetperpetuelle de M. lAbbi de Saint-Pierre, quoted in Jonathan
Haslam, No Virtue Like Necessiy: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli 82 (Yale
2002).
37 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals at 171 (cited in note 34).
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solution that proposes neither a unitary world-state like the Chinese or Roman
Empires, nor a loose alliance like the Hague Congresses, nor even a global
government modeled on American federalism. Here, in place of the "positive
idea of a world republic," Kant offered the "negative substitute of an enduring
and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war."3 8 While this "negative
substitute" falls short of the ideal of a "world republic" or unitary, federal global
government, it provides the basis for a feasible program of action that can, over
time, foster the conditions for a lasting global peace.
In PeqpetualPeace, Kant repudiated the analogy on which he relied elsewhere
between individual men in the state of nature and individual nations in the state
of international anarchy. Thus, he wrote:
[W]hile natural right allows us to say of men living in a lawless condition
that they ought to abandon it, the right of nations does not allow us to say
the same of states. For as states, they already have a lawful internal
constitution, and thus have outgrown the coercive right of others to subject
them to a wider legal constitution in accordance with their conception of
right.39
Yet, as he did elsewhere, he also insisted here on the necessity of a general
agreement between nations that would establish a permanent (rather than a
merely provisional) peace: "reason, as the highest legislative moral power,
absolutely condemns war as a test of rights and sets up peace as an immediate
duty. But peace can neither be inaugurated nor secured without a general
agreement between the nations., 4' Here that agreement is to establish "a
particular kind of league, which we might call a pacific federation (foedus
padficum).'' Significantly, though, this "league" or "federation" is to be neither a
loose-jointed treaty alliance, nor a world state, nor a federal union along the lines
of the US.
This federation does not aim to acquire any power like that of a state, but
merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each state in itself, along with
that of the other confederated states, although this does not mean that they
need to submit to public laws and to a coercive power which enforces them,
as men do in a state of nature. 42
38 Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch in Reiss, ed, Kant: Political Writings at 105 (cited in note
16).
39 Id at 104.
40 Id.
41 Id (italics added).
42 Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch in Reiss, ed, Kant: Political Writings at 104 (cited in note
16).
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The sovereignty of the member states of such a league is thus preserved and no
supra-state necessarily emerges from their union.43 Yet the bonds that link the
member states together are far stronger and more cohesive than those that unite
the members of a defensive alliance, and the outcome of their association is not
merely a provisional end to any hostilities between them, but the makings of a
durable peace.
How is that possible? Kant's insight is to see that the internal or "civil"
constitutions of the member states of such a federation can make a decisive
difference. Kant has argued that states with "republican" civil constitutions have
an innate predisposition to peace. So "if by good fortune one powerful and
enlightened nation can form a republic," that nation can provide "a focal point
for federal association among other states. 4 4 Other states, not feeling
threatened by that powerful but peaceable republican state, will be drawn to
establish friendly relations with it. Peaceful relations will tend to promote
prosperity, as the states involved shed the burdens of preparing for, waging, and
43 Although Kant himself does not distinguish the various legal forms that a "league" might assume,
accounts of the "constitutional" structure of the EU bring different possibilities to light. At least
three accounts of the EU have been given. Some analysts think that the EU is (or should remain)
an intergovernmental organization; others think that it is evolving into a federal union. Still others
think that it represents some form of hybrid that is neither an intergovernmental organization nor
a centrally controlled federation but a unique fusion of both. See Stephen C. Sieberson, The Treaty
of Lisbon and Its Impact on the European Union's Democratic Deficit, 14 Colum J Eur L 445, 447 (2008);
consider Kristin Archick & Derek E. Mix, The European Union's Reform Process: The Lisbon Treay,
Cong Res Service Report for Congress 7-5700 (Oct 7, 2009). If the EU is conceptualized as a
hybrid, it may incorporate aspects of a supra-state without being a federal union. It may be correct
to understand the EU in that light. In The Lisbon Case, a major recent decision adjudicating a
challenge under Germany's Basic Law (Grundgeset) to the proposed 2007 Treaty of Lisbon
(which, if ratified, will become the new legal basis for the EU), the German Federal Constitutional
Court determined that the EU "is designed as an association of sovereign national states
(Staatenverbund) to which sovereign powers are transferred. The concept of Verbund covers a close
long-term association of states which remain sovereign, an association which exercises public
authority on the basis of a treaty, whose fundamental order, however, is subject to the disposal of
the Member States alone and in which the peoples of their Member states, for example, the
citizens of the states, remain the subjects of democratic legitimization .... The empowerment [of
Germany's political bodies under art. 23 of the GrundgesetdJ to transfer sovereign powers to the
EU or other intergovernmental institutions permits a shift of political rule to international
organizations. The empowerment to exercise supranational competences comes, however, from
the Member States of such an institution. They therefore permanently remain the masters of the
Treaties." Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGl (Federal Constitutional Court) Jun 20, 2009
("Lisbon case"), 2 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 8 I 229, 231)
(FRG). The Court emphasized that Member States of the EU retain the right to withdraw from it,
and that withdrawal would not be "secession." See id at 233.
44 Kant, Perpetual Peace at 104 (cited in note 16). Kant may have had France in mind as that
"powerful and enlightened" republic. See Wagner, War and the State 100 (cited in note 9).
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recovering from wars with each other.4" Furthermore, peaceful relations between
states will open the door to commerce and trade among them, creating
interdependencies that Kant believes will also deter them from going to war with
one another.46 And the success of their alliance will in turn draw still other states
into association with them.
A crucial step in this argument is, obviously, the claim that "republics" will
be naturally disposed to peace.47 In defending that claim, Kant maintained that a
republican form of government would introduce political and legal controls not
found in monarchies or other non-republican constitutions that would greatly
reduce the likelihood of (aggressive) war.
If, as is inevitably the case under this [republican] constitution, the consent
of citizens is required to decide whether or not war is to be declared, it is
very natural that they will have a great hesitation in embarking on so
45 As W.B. Gallie argues: "[T]he real strength-if not the 'teeth'--of [Kant's] proposed federation
lies in its capacity to maintain and extend peace among a number of like-minded powers. In this
way it will demonstrate . . . that marked non-aggression pays-in a quite material sense-in a
world where war is becoming ever more costly and more destructive." W.B. Gallie, Philosophers of
Peace and War Kant, Clausewita- Marx, Engels and Tolstoy 25 (Cambridge 1978).
46 See Wagner, War and the State 99 (cited in note 9). The theory that economic interdependencies
tend to promote peaceful relations between trading partners has been subjected to serious
criticism. See Kenneth Waltz, The Myth of National Interdependence, in Kenneth Waltz, Realism and
International Poliics 152 (Routledge 2008) (arguing that close relationships between nations increase
the chances for conflict). For a review of the literature and an evaluation of the interdependency
thesis, see Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War, 20 Intl Sec 5 (1996).
47 What Kant meant by a "republic" might seem uncertain, given that the term was often used to
refer to constitutions of very different kinds. See The Federalist No 39 (Madison), in The Federalist
Papers 240 (Mentor 1983) ("What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form?
Were an answer to this question to be sought, not by recurring to principles, but in the application
of the term by political writers, to the constitution of different States, no satisfactory one would
ever be found."). However, Kant helpfully identified three principles on which "republican"
constitutions are founded: "firstly, the principle of freedom for all members of a society (as men);
secondly, the principle of dependence of everyone upon a single common legislation (as subjects);
and thirdly, the principle of legal equaliy for everyone (as citizens). It is the only constitution
which can be derived from the idea of an original contract .. " Kant, PerpetualPeace at 99-100
(cited in note 16). Furthermore, Kant went to some pains to state that "republics" must be
distinguished from (classical) democracies, which involved direct popular rule by the citizen body
and which accordingly did not manifest a separation of powers. Id at 100-01. Later interpreters
have reasonably understood Kant to be referring to "a political society that has solved the
problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order." Doyle, Kant, Liberal
Legacies, and Foreign Affairs at 21 (cited in note 5). In substance, this is to say that Kant may be
taken to be speaking of liberal-capitalist constitutional democracies. See also Wolfgang Kersting,
Politics, Freedom, and Order, in Paul Guyer, ed, Cambridge Companion to Kant 342, 361 (Cambridge
1992) (equating republicanism with "a political order characterized by parliamentary democracy,
popular representation and the division of power").
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dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling down on themselves
all the miseries of war. . . .48
Citizens of republics, Kant argued, would be most reluctant to assume the
burden of fighting themselves, paying for the costs of war out of their own
resources, facing the risks of devastation to their property, and saddling
themselves with onerous war debts. By contrast, in constitutional systems in
which the subject is not a citizen, the rulers can force the burdens of warfare
onto the subject while capturing its gains for themselves.4 9 Indeed, as Kenneth
Waltz has noted, Kant argues that the inner dynamics of war, including the
competition among different groups of economically predatory rulers, will itself
enable subjects to wrest liberty from those rulers, and thus serve to bring about
"republican" government.50
C. KANT'S CENTRAL INSIGHTS
Kant's central insights were to link a state's (liberal-democratic) civil
constitution to the type of policies it will espouse with respect to war and peace,
and then to explain how associations of like-minded free states will tend to form
zones of peace. These insights have rightly been acclaimed as "a revolutionary
48 Kant, Perpetual Peace at 100 (cited in note 16). In an extremely influential work originally published
in 1962, Habermas called attention to the rise of "public opinion" as a force for peace. See Jiirgen
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiy into a Categoy of Bouqgeois Sodety
(MIT 1989) (Thomas Burger, trans). According to Habermas, the eighteenth century witnessed
the emergence of a "bourgeois public sphere" in which matters of public policy were rationally
and publicly debated. The bourgeois public sphere was adamantly opposed to secrecy in
government affairs, not least in the form of kabinett diplomatie (cabinet diplomacy) of the kind
defended and practiced by, among others, Prussia's King Frederick II. The greater transparency
demanded by the bourgeois public sphere strengthened democratic political controls over states'
war-making. See James Van Horn Melton, The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe 8
(Cambridge 2001).
49 Kant was not the only eighteenth-century thinker to discern a link between the republican form
of government and a tendency towards peace. For example, Montesquieu had said that "[tihe
spirit of monarchy is war and enlargement of dominion: peace and moderation are the spirit of a
republic." See Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, 1 The Complete Works of M. de
Montesquieu, Book 9 Ch 2, 895 (T. Evans 1777). See also Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man 362
J.S. Jordan 1791). Consider Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Consdence 23-30 (Rutgers 1986).
50 See Kenneth Waltz, Kant, Liberalism, and War in Waltz, Realism and International Politics 10-11 (cited
in note 46). Thus in Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History, Kant shrewdly points out that "the
risk of war is the only thing which keeps despotism in check, because a state must now have
wealth before it can be powerful, and there can be no wealth-producing activity without
freedom." See Kant, Cojectures on the Beginning of Human History at 231 (cited in note 16). See also
the remarks in Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose in Reiss, ed,
Kant, Political Writings 41, at 51 (cited in note 16). Waltz's insight has been taken further in the
penetrating account by Wagner, War and the State at 118-20, 202-06 (cited in note 9).
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step forward in political philosophy."'" To be sure, Kant does not quite advocate
the "democratic peace thesis," if only because he does not insist that the
members of his "pacific federations" must all be republics. Nonetheless, he
supplies the core of the democratic peace idea. By his reasoning, a league of
republics would be more likely to promote peace among its members than a
league that included non-republics (because the latter would retain their
propensity for war, even if to a lesser degree). Moreover, careful students of
Kant (including Habermas5 2) read him to be contemplating a "liberal pacific
union" or a "'pacific union' of liberal repubics" 3 -in other words, a league
whose members are all (or predominantly) "republican." Thus, even though later
writers provide much deeper and fuller accounts than Kant's as to why the
political and constitutional structures of mature liberal democracies tend to
produce peace among them,54 Kant can properly be credited with anticipating
the democratic peace thesis.
55
Kant apparently considered the idea of promoting peace through a league
of republics as less satisfying from the moral point of view than the idea of a
federal world state or republic. That is why he characterized the former as a
"negative substitute" for the latter.56 He wrote:
51 Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, at 13 (cited in note 45). Galie explains:
[Kant] had made the first significant step ... to construct a framework of ideas within which
the generally acknowledged rights and duties of states vis-A-vis their own citizens can be
shown to require, logically, its acknowledgement of certain equally important rights and
duties towards each other (and each other's citizens) if their traditionally recognized tasks are
ever to be effectively discharged.
Id at 13-14. Gallie brings out the conceptual side of Kant's insight. But there is also an empirical
side-the democratic peace thesis-which we wish to underscore here.
52 See Jurgen Habermas, The Kantian Project and the Divided West, in Habermas, The Divided West at 125
(cited in note 4) ("[A]ssociated with the project of a league of nations is the idea of an ever-
expanding federation of republics engaging in commerce which renounce wars of aggression.").
53 Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legades, and Foreign Affairs at 21-22 (cited in note 5). See also David
Cortwright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas 242 (Cambridge 2008) ("Kant envisioned the
proposed federation as 'a pacific union' of liberal republics.").
54 See, for example, Lipson, Reliable Partners at 11-15, 77-138 (cited in note 7).
55 See Cortwright, Peace at 241 (cited in note 53) (applauding Kant's prescience "in foretelling what
contemporary analysts call the democratic peace").
56 The distinguished Kantian interpreter F.H. Hinsley understood Kant differently. Discussing
Kant's "negative substitute" of a league of republican states, 1-insley said that "[far from reaching
this conclusion in any spirit of regret or despair at the conduct of states, far from merely
accepting the continuing independence of states as inescapable, Kant insisted on it as morally
right." F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between
States 63 (Cambridge 1963). We disagree. Kant plainly affirms that individual states have the duty
to surmount the condition of international anarchy and to bring war to a definitive end by
forming a cosmopolitan constitution, which he envisages would establish a federated union of
states. See, for example, Kant, On the Common Saying at 92; see also Kant, Ideafor a Universal Histogy
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There is only one rational way in which states coexisting with other states
can emerge from the lawless condition of pure warfare. Just like individual
men [in the state of nature], they must renounce their savage and lawless
freedom, adapt themselves to public coercive laws, and thus form an
international state (dvitas genlium), which would necessarily continue to grow
until it embraced all the peoples of the earth. But since this is not the will of
nations, according to their present conception of international right. . ., the
positive idea of a world republic cannot be realized. If all is not to be lost,
this can at best find a negative substitute in the shape of an enduring and
gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war.
We agree with Habermas' interpretation of passages such as this. As Habermas
argues, a "constitution" for the international community was, from Kant's usual
perspective:
conceivable only in the form of a republic of republics, that is, as a
"republicanism of all states" or as a "world republic." In this way, the
constitution of the nation-state realized through [transformations such as
the American and French Revolutions] becomes the model for the
transition ... to cosmopolitan law.5 8
The "negative substitute" of a loose league of democratic states must therefore
seem conceptually and normatively defective, even if it provides the best feasible
alternative to a world republic.
This is the point at which we part company with Kant. We think it would
be misguided to attempt to promote the goals of global peace and respect for
human rights through a program of invigorating international or supranational
organizations leading, ideally, to the eventual emergence of an "international
state" or "world republic." We believe that a sounder and more fruitful way of
at 41, 47-8 (cited in note 16); accord Carl Joachim Friedrich, Inevitable Peace 45-6 (Harvard 1948).
As discussed in the text above, that union would bear some resemblance, on a planetary scale, to
the federal system of the US; it would not be a global empire along the lines of a planetary Roman
or Chinese Empire. Kant thinks that this duty is as incumbent upon states as the corresponding
duty to leave the state of nature and enter into a civil constitution is incumbent upon individual
men. The difference between men and states is not, in his view, the nature of the moral duty that
binds them: in both cases, it is the duty to suppress violence and war, and to submit disputes to
legal adjudication. The difference rather is that while individual men may and should coerce other
men into a civil constitution, states cannot generally mobilize the force to compel other states to
associate with them in a cosmopolitan constitution that established a (federal) world-state. As we
see it, then, Kant is yielding to what he sees as hard, practical necessity in advocating the
"negative substitute."
Nonetheless, the exegetical issue is not easy to resolve. See Pangle and Ahrensdorf, Juslice Among
Nations at 200 (cited in note 26) (arguing that the precise shape of Kant's "league" of nations has
strong ambiguities). For a recent survey of the different interpretations and an attempt to reach a
solution, see Pauline Kleingeld, Kant's Theory of Peace, in Paul Guyer, ed, The Cambridge Companion to
Kant andModem Philosophy 477, 483-88 (Cambridge 2006).
57 Kant, Peroetual Peace at 105 (cited in note 16).
58 Habermas, The Divided West at 123 (cited in note 4).
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achieving those goals is through the promotion of democratic government in
particular states-Kant's "negative substitute." The former approach would
entail the eventual elimination of nation states, or at least their incorporation
into an indissoluble federal union on a planetary scale-a union whose "public
coercive laws" would bind its members and be enforceable against them. The
latter approach would seek to democratize, rather than federalize, the world's
various states. States would retain their political independence and territorial
integrity. Their military and political association, if any, would take the form of a
league, in which membership was voluntary and from which withdrawal was
permissible.
II. HABERMAS' VERSION OF THE KANTIAN PROJECT
Habermas' version of the "Kantian project" seeks, like that of Kant
himself, to transform or "constitutionalize" classic, state-centered public
international law. The "constitutionalization" of international law, Habermas
argues, would construct an international legal order that "renders war as a
legitimate means of resolving conflicts, indeed war as such, impossible, because
there cannot be 'external' conflicts within a globally inclusive commonwealth.
What had hitherto been military conflicts would assume the character of police
actions and operations of criminal justice."59 In other words, under a
"constitutionalized" international system, states would no longer be able to
exercise the "right" to go to war-the "core component" of classic public
international law.6" The question then, of course, becomes how such a
"constitutionalized" international order is to be achieved.
Even more firmly than Kant, Habermas rejects the possibility of bringing
about the "legal pacification of world society by repressive means, that is,
through a despotic monopoly of power." Neither Kant nor Habermas,
therefore, claims that perpetual peace can only be achieved through creating a
world-state, even of a federal kind.6' In place of that proposal, Habermas
invokes Kant's "core innovation" which was to envision "the transformation of
international law as a law of states into cosmopolitan law as a law of
individuals. 62 Instead of being merely the citizens of their own states,
individuals would be viewed as members of a "cosmopolitan commonwealth,"
59 Id at 123.
60 Id at 133.
61 Habermas, The Divided West at 124 (cited in note 4). See also id at 134 ("The democratic federal
state writ large-the global state of nations or world republic-is the wrong model.").
62 Id at 124.
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and their "civil rights" would "penetrate international relations too." 3 This
transformation, Habermas suggests, would mean more than merely codifying
certain basic legal rights that anyone, whether a citizen or not, might claim
against any state. It would entail a fundamental change, not only in the relations
between states and rights-bearing individuals, but also between states and other
states. World citizenship would necessitate some form of world legal order-an
order that subordinated the legal systems of particular states to a globalized legal
system. To realize the idea of world citizenship, therefore, states would have to
sacrifice not only their internal, but also their external, sovereignty to "a higher
authority":
The price paid by sovereign states uniting to form a "large state body" for
promoting their citizens to world citizens is that they must submit to a
higher authority. In acquiring the status of members of a republic of
republics, they renounce the option of substituting politics for law in their
dealings with other member states. The imposition of the format of a state
on international relations would mean that law completely permeates and
transforms political power, even in external relations among states. The
difference between external and internal sovereignty would thereby
disappear, not only on account of the global scale of the inclusive state of
nations, but also for normative reasons. 64
If the preferred outcome of the "constitutionalization" of international law is
not the emergence of a world state of which all individuals are citizens, however,
then what is its outcome? What, precisely, is the nature of the "higher authority"
that Habermas has in view? Habermas opposes "the thoroughly individualistic
legal order of a federal world republic," for example, the idea of "a politically
constituted global society that reserves institutions and procedures of global
63 Id.
64 Id at 123. In a lengthy newspaper article entitled Bestialio and Humanity, published in Die Zeit on
April 29, 1999, Habermas explained more lucidly than he was to do in The Divided West the
conceptual nexus between the rights of individuals as cosmopolitan citizens and entrenchment of
peace between states. He wrote:
"llegal pacifism wants not just to restrict the latent state of war between sovereign
states by means of international law, but also to replace it with a cosmopolitan order
based on law.... Direct membership in an association of world citizens would protect
any state citizen against the arbitrary actions of their [sic] own governments .... The
most important consequence of an international law that even bypasses the sovereignty
of states is, as can be seen already in the case of Pinochet, the personal liability of
leaders and officials for the crimes committed during their state and war service."
Jiirgen Habermas, Bestialioy and Humanoy: A War on the Border Between Law and Moraliy, Die Zeit 1,
1-2 (April 29, 1999) (Franz Solms-Laubach, trans). In other words, it is the threat of personal
criminal liability for aggression or other war crimes that will deter political and military leaders
from committing those crimes, thus tending to bring about peace. Whether this "deterrent"
would be effective is, of course, open to doubt; but Habermas' program of "legal pacifism"
depends upon it.
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governance for states at both the supra- and transnational levels."65 Instead, he
argues that the "constitutionalization" of international law requires the
construction of "a supranational power above competing states that would equip
the international community with the executive and sanctioning powers required
to implement and enforce its rules and decisions."66  To repeat, this
"supranational power" is not itself any form of a "republican state., 6 7 Rather,
the transformation of classic international law into a global constitution must be
envisaged as a process that begins with "a 'weakly' constituted community of
states (by comparison with the republican state)," and then goes on to
"supplement" that community "at the supranational level by legislative and
adjudicative bodies and by sanctioning powers."6 So augmented, the resulting
community will be enabled to "tak[e] political initiatives and execut[e] joint
decisions."69 The "constitutionalizing" process thus moves "from the non-
hierarchical associations of collective actors [states] to the supra- and
transnational organizations of a cosmopolitan order.,
70
Significantly, Habermas believes that the key elements of such a
cosmopolitan order, though insufficiently developed, are already in place. These
are "the three most imposing examples of international organizations"-the
UN, the EU, and the WTO. 7' The task immediately ahead for the "Kantian
project," therefore, is to fortify these international organizations by expanding
their legal powers. While at present the three organizations "give the impression
of a suit of clothes a couple of sizes too big waiting to be filled out," the
community of states must provide them with "a stronger body of organizational
law-in other words .. .stronger transnational and supranational mandates for
governance.
' 72
Let us now examine more closely why Habermas considers the UN to be
already a key component of an emerging cosmopolitan world order and what
future role he would assign to that organization as his Kantian project unfolds.
Habermas points out, correctly, that the UN has already acquired (or assumed)
the legal authority to intervene in the internal affairs of criminal governments
and failing states. "In these two policy domains, the member states grant the UN
Security Council the competence to protect the rights of citizens against their
65 Habermas, The Divided West at 135 (cited in note 4).
66 Id at 132.
67 Id at 133.
68 Id.
69 Habermas, The Divided West at 133 (cited in note 4).
70 Id.
71 Id at 133-34.
72 Id at 134.
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own governments if necessary. Hence, it would be consistent to describe the
world organization as already a community of 'states and citizens.' ' , 3 As for the
future, a "suitably reformed world organization could perform the vital but
clearly circumscribed functions of securing peace and promoting human rights
at the supranational level in an effective and non-selective fashion without
having to assume the state-like character of a world republic. ' 74 Although
Habermas does not identify here what these suitable reforms to the UN would
be, he asserts in his essay Bestiality and Humanity that "a necessary precondition"
for a "world civil society" would be "a well-functioning Security Council, the
binding judgments of an international court of criminal justice and the
complementing of the General Assembly of government representatives with a
'second level chamber' composed of representatives of world citizens. 7 5
We think that Habermas has fundamentally misunderstood the nature of
the UN, and has therefore designed a role for it in the protcction of global
security and the promotion of human rights that it lacks any real capacity to
perform. The UN is simply nothing like a Kantian league of liberal-democratic
states and could not possibly serve the cause of global peace in the way that
Kant envisaged that such a league would do. Thus, instead of carrying Kant's
project forward, Habermas ends up betraying it.
Although it has been suggested that the UN "in many respects fulfills those
conditions which Immanuel Kant had formulated as essential to the
establishment of a world-wide organization,"76 it is immediately obvious that the
UN has never borne any resemblance to a Kantian league of free republics and,
barring an almost inconceivable transformation, will never mature into one.
Admission to membership in the UN has been consistently based on the
principle of universality or non-discrimination by regime type. In contrast, the
essence of a truly Kantian league is that its members be at least predominantly
"republican" or liberal-democratic. In this respect, at least, the UN has been true
to its origins in practice."7
The original nucleus of the UN was, of course, the wartime affiance of four
Great Powers (the US, the UK, the Soviet Union and, by courtesy, China) that
had defeated the Axis. These powers invited the states that had signed the
Declaration of the UN to attend the UN Conference on International
73 Habermas, The Divided West at 135 (cited in note 4).
74 Id at 136.
75 Habermas, Bestialiy and Humanity, Die Zeit at 4 (cited in note 64).
76 Friedrich, Ineitable Peace at 33 (cited in note 56).
77 See Hans Kelsen, Membership in the United Nations, 46 Colum L Rev 391, 395 (1946) (noting that
the Charter "does not require a democratic form of government as a condition of being or
becoming a member of the Organization").
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Organization in San Francisco. Original membership in the proposed
organization was offered as a matter of right to all states that were participating
at least formally in the struggle against the Axis. Neutrals and enemies would be
able to seek admission later."8 At the San Francisco Conference, "most of the
delegates ... were thinking in terms of membership ultimately to be universal.
Some, indeed, would have made membership of all nations automatic or
required... ."" The coalition of Great Powers which transformed its wartime
alliance into a permanent international organization included both the world's
leading liberal-democratic, capitalist states and the world's leading Communist
state, the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin. With the exception of the Fascist
states, their allies and some suspect quasi-neutrals, the organization was open to
states regardless of r6gime type.8"
Article 4 of the UN Charter sets forth the conditions for admission to
(non-original) membership of the organization. Article 4(1) states that
"[m]embership in the United Nations is open to all other peaceloving states
which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the
judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these
obligations."81 The Article imposes no requirement on the political system or
constitutional character of future member states, other than that they be
"peaceloving"-a condition aimed at Axis enemies. In an advisory opinion of
1948, the International Court of Justice ruled that the qualifications for
admission set forth in Article 4(1) were exhaustive, and that additional political
considerations could not be superimposed above them.8 2 However, conflict
between the Western and Eastern blocs in the early Cold War period led to
disputes over the admission of new members, as the Soviet Union and its allies
78 See UN Charter Art 3 (1945); see also Clyde Eagleton, The United Naions: Aims and Structure, 55
Yale LJ 974, 975-76 (1946).
79 Id at 983.
80 By contrast, although membership in the League of Nations was legally open to states without
regard to their constitutional character, ideological conflict prevented the Soviet Union from
becoming a League member until 1934. See Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present,
and Future of the United Nations 13 (Random House 2006); F.P. Walters, 2 A History of the League of
Naions 579-85 (Oxford 1952). Indeed, Woodrow Wilson had originally argued (in very Kantian
terms) that any future league should consist solely of democratic states. See President Woodrow
Wilson, We Must Accept War, Address to Congress (April 2, 1947); see also Edward H. Buehrig,
Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power 138-39 (Indiana 1955) (describing the similar views of
Wilson's Secretary of State Lansing).
81 UN Charter Art 4 (1945).
82 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Advisory Opinion),
1948 ICJ 57, 62. The Court did however read Article 4 to permit "the taking into account of any
factor which it is possible reasonably and in good faith to connect with the conditions laid down"
in the Article. Id at 63.
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initially found themselves badly outnumbered in the General Assembly. 3
Furthermore, Spain, then under the rule of Generalissimo Franco, presented a
special and problematic case in view of its pre-war association with Nazi
Germany and Fascist Italy. 4 But in 1955, the organization admitted sixteen new
members, including Spain (which was still governed by the Franco regime), and
thus established the principle of non-discrimination in membership." The UN's
membership has included states having such very different types of civil
constitutions as liberal-democratic republicanism (the US), communism (the
Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China), constitutional monarchy (the
UK, Norway), tribally based monarchy (Saudi Arabia), Papal rule (the Vatican),
Islamist theocracy with democratic elements (Iran), dictatorships and military
juntas of both the left and right, and more. Indeed, it could reasonably be argued
that the principle of sovereign equality embodied in Article 2(1) logically entails
that admission to membership bc open to all states, regardless of their political
form.
It is precisely because UN membership is universal and non-discriminatory
in this sense, however, that the organization cannot function as anything like a
Kantian republican league. Its foundational premises, buttressed by decades of
practice, preclude that possibility. And it is precisely because the UN has this
character that several major political leaders (for example, Senator John
McCain86) and legal scholars (for example, Philip Bobbitt 7 ) have argued that the
US should take the lead in forming a global league of democracies, obviously
contemplating that association as an alternative to the UN. Indeed, the creation
of NATO-a true Kantian league of democracies 8 8-attests that only four years
83 Simon Chesterman, Thomas M. Franck & David M. Malone, eds, Law and Practice of the United
Nations: Documents and Commentanv 163-64 (Oxford 2008).
84 Spain had not been invited to the San Francisco Conference, which adopted a resolution designed
to keep Spain out of the UN. A General Assembly Resolution of February 1946 reaffirmed that
position. See Evan Luard, 1 A Histonv of the United Nations: The Years of Western Domination 1945-
1955 361-64 (St. Martin's 1982); Louis B. Sohn, The Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal From an
International Oganization, 77 Harv L Rev 1381, 1401-02 (1964).
85 Consider Leo Gross, Progress Towards Universalily of Membership in the United Nations, 50 Am J Intl L
791 (1956).
86 John McCain, America Must Be a Good Role Model, The Financial Times (Mar 18, 2008) ("We need
to strengthen our transatlantic alliance as the core of a new global compact-a League of
Democracies-that can harness the great power of the more than 100 democratic nations around
the world to advance our values and defend our shared interests.').
87 Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Centuy (Knopf 2008) (arguing that
democracies should unite to counter global terrorism).
8 See Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From 'Empire" by Invitation to
Transatlantic Drift 65-66 (Oxford 2003) (characterizing NATO as a "security community" in which
there is a real assurance that community members will not fight each other).
Winter 2010
Delahuno and Yoo
Chicago Journal of International Law
after the UN had come into being, it was evident that the organization could not
protect the peace. The entire history of the UN has been characterized by
recurring and intractable conflicts that have arisen (largely) out of the different
constitutional forms of its member states and that have produced chronic
impasses over vital questions of international security. Thus, the very universality
of the UN all but ensures that attempts to promote international peace and
security through its agency will be stymied. No likely "reform" of the UN will
change that fact.
To be concrete: the Security Council includes two permanent, veto-
wielding members-China and Russia-both of which are undemocratic (or at
least, in Russia's case, not a mature democracy8 9) and both of which have
extremely poor human rights records. It would be absurd to expect these two
states to emerge as paladins of human rights. Further, both of those states have
regularly shielded "outlaw" states that pose serious threats to global or regional
peace (such as North Korea, Iran, Serbia and Sudan) from effective UN
sanctions. It is overwhelmingly likely that they will do so in the future. To be
sure, the Security Council can help to manage and mitigate Great Power
disagreement.90 Furthermore, Security Council authorization for the use of force
can legitimize an outside intervention-and legitimacy is desired even by
powerful states. 9' But the Council cannot be expected to take the lead in
promoting peace and human rights. 92 We can hardly blink at the UN's poor
performance over more than six decades in both those areas. 9'
89 For a recent, highly pessimistic account of Russia's chances of becoming a democracy, see Steven
Rosefielde and Stefan Hedlund, Russia Since 1980: Wrestling with Westemization (Cambridge 2008)
(arguing that scholars have overestimated Russian prospects for liberalization and
democratization). Nonetheless, Russia's political leaders at least profess that "the modern state is
above all a democratic state." President Dmitry Medvedev, Speech at the International
Conference on the Modem State and Global Security (Sept. 15, 2009), online at
http://www.yaroslavl-2009.ru/eng/about/partl74 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
90 For instance, the Security Council provided a "unique forum" that facilitated certain forms of
diplomatic engagement between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis of
1962. See Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis: International Crises and the Role of Law 84-85
(Oxford 1974). Even then, however, traditional bilateral dealings between the Powers concerned
seems to have been far more important in resolving the crisis.
91 See Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimay & Power in the United Nations Secunriy Council 124-31
(Princeton 2007).
92 See Goldhagen, Worse Than War at 592 (cited in note 12) ("We should do away with the United
Nations . . . because it is illegitimate, and ineffectual, and corrupt, and does far too little to
coordinate the world's countries to alleviate misery, including to fight against exterminationist and
eliminationist politics.").
93 On several occasions, the present authors have documented the poor record of the UN in
upholding international security and have argued that the Charter system suffers from incurable
defects at the level of both legal norm and institutional design. We need not repeat those
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Habermas' signal failure to acknowledge that the Charter system is often an
obstacle to human rights enforcement was evident in Bestiality and Humaniy, his
1999 essay in Die Zeit on the War in Kosovo. There Habermas half-heartedly
defended NATO's intervention in the (then) Serbian province of Kosovo-an
armed intervention that succeeded in halting what he called the "murderous
ethno-nationalism" being practiced by the Miloseviq government. 4 Habermas
agreed that Milosevi 's "victims [do not] have to be left at the mercy of their
persecutors," at least if "there is no other way out."'" But he was greatly
troubled that NATO was acting without a Security Council mandate, and instead
had to rely on moral and humanitarian considerations to justify its actions.
"Moral norms, which appeal to our better judgment, should not be enforced like
established laws." 96 Characteristically, the burden of suspicion, for Habermas,
fell entirely on the Western alliance, and especially on the US, rather than on the
UN. For him, the US was merely displaying "a new hybrid of humanitarian
selflessness and the logic of imperialist power politics. '9 7 Utterly missing in
Habermas' discussion was any suggestion that the Security Council had defaulted
on its obligation to protect the Kosovar Albanians from mass atrocities, that its
unwillingness to authorize NATO's intervention underscored the Council's
indifference to gross human rights violations, and that the Council, far more
than the Western alliance, was being driven by old-fashioned "power politics."
Finally, even if Habermas were right in thinking that a "suitably reformed"
UN could have an important role to play in a fully institutionalized cosmopolitan
constitution, he is plainly mistaken in claiming that the functions he would have
the organization perform are "clearly circumscribed." 98 If a reformed UN were
empowered to perform those functions-which he identifies as "securing peace
and promoting human rights at the supranational level in an effective and non-
selective fashion" 99-and somehow proved capable of doing so, then it would
make far deeper inroads into the sovereignty of its member states than it does
presently. Indeed, there would be little to distinguish it from the world republic
that Habermas professes to reject. Consider, for example, that Habermas' notion
that "under an effective UN peace and security regime, even global players
arguments here. See, for example, Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, Great Power Security, 1OU
Chi J Intl L 35, 42-46 (2009); Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, Peace Through Law? The Failure
of a Noble Experiment, 106 Mich L Rev 923 (2008).
94 Habermas, Beslialfiy and Humanity Die Zeit at 2 (cited in note 64).
95 Id at 6.
96 Id at 6.
97 Id (quoting Ulrich Beck).
98 Habermas, The Divided West at 136 (cited in note 4).
99 Id.
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would be forbidden to resort to war."1 °0 Not only does that seem to mean that
the UN would be able to face down any combination of recalcitrant Great
Powers, but it also suggests that states could no longer engage in legitimate self-
defense. We find it extraordinarily hard to imagine how such a situation could
arise except under a unitary and encompassing world government. Or consider
what would follow if an international organization had the authority and power
to implement human rights across the globe. Surely that organization would
have vast power in relation to its member states-so much so that only vestiges
of internal sovereignty would remain to them. Habermas' cosmopolitan program
would require a sweeping transfer of authority from the national level to the
supranational level, comparable in scope and comprehensiveness to the changes
in American federalism brought about by the Fourteenth Amendment.1' In
short, the only way to realize Habermas' vision would be through world
government.
III. PERPETUAL PEACE AND DEMOCRACY-
PROMOTION
Democracy promotion in particular states presents a way forward that does
not rely on the utopian vision of a world republic or federation founded on a
cosmopolitan international constitution. As we have argued here and elsewhere,
the notion of a supranational global government exercising sovereign powers
simply does not describe a reality where neither the UN nor international courts
have any enforcement mechanisms of their own. If current international
institutions were to somehow develop into a supranational government, as we
suggested in Section II, they would rest upon anti-democratic foundations that
would make impossible republican government.0 2 A government strong enough
to exercise sovereign authority throughout the world would have to receive the
100 Id.
101 See, for example, Garrett Epps, The Antebellum Political Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 L
& Contemp Probs 175 (2004) ("[T]he changes the Fourteenth Amendment wrought in our
system were far reaching and profound ... for the relationship between states and the federal
government.").
102 Thus, the German Federal Constitutional Court found in The Lisbon Case that if the degree of
political integration in the EU were eventually to "reach] a level corresponding to the federal
level in a federal state," then a "structural democratic deficit" would arise in that supra-state that
would be "unacceptable" under Germany's Basic Law. The Lisbon Case, at 264 (cited in note 43).
"With the present status of integration, the European Union does, even upon the entry into force
of the Treaty of Lisbon, not yet attain a shape that corresponds to level of legitimization of a
democracy constituted as a state." Id at 276. On the question of a "democratic deficit" in the
EU's institutions, see Mattias Kumm, Why Europeans Fill Not Embrace Constitutional Pattiotism, 6
IndJ Const L 117 (2008).
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consent of democracies and autocracies. The latter would only allow such a
world government if it could not threaten their regimes.
Our argument is not based on the notion, which remains controversial
among political philosophers and legal scholars, that a universal set of human
rights exists and that this package includes the right to democratic
government.'0 3 We disagree, therefore, with the views of President George W.
Bush, insofar as he argued that the primary objective of the US in promoting
democracy should be to uphold the individual right of self-determination. One
may well argue instead that foreign policy should aim to increase overall human
welfare rather than individual human rights'0 4 or that global security and stability
must come first before economic development and human rights can
improve.' Furthermore, "democracy" might eventually emerge in, for example,
the Islamic world in a form that is different from its historical forms in the
West.'0 6 Instead, we identify democracy as a point of agreement between
Kantians and those who view international politics through a more instrumental
lens. Because of the democratic peace thesis, and explanations for its empirical
findings, nations such as the US and its allies may pursue a policy that is in their
security interests, but which has the benefit of drawing the world closer toward
the league of republics as sketched by Kant. Such an outcome would operate like
the invisible hand of the market, in that democracies pursuing their own self-
interest in an anarchic international system will produce gains for global welfare.
Welfare will increase through the maintenance of a peaceful, stable international
system that will allow for economic development and trade, and individuals
within the states will enjoy a certain level of freedom and maintain their cultural
identities. If the world becomes Kantian, it will be by the pursuit of national self-
interest, an irony that might well have pleased Kant.
But before we reach any conclusion on whether American foreign policy
ought to promote democracy-even to the point of using force to achieve
regime change-we need to understand the roots of the democratic peace. If the
peace is only a statistical regularity explained by factors other than domestic
103 In the optimism of the immediate post-Cold War period, a right in international law to
democratic government seemed to some observers to be emerging. See Thomas M. Franck, The
Emeging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am J Intl L 46 (1992). It is open to debate whether that
trend in the law has persisted.
104 See, for example, Eric Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 Colum L Rev 1758 (2008).
105 John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U Chi L Rev 729, 785-87 (2004).
106 See Ali A. Allawi, The Crisis of Islamic CiviliZation 166-70, 184-85 (2009); consider Khaled Abou El
Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democragy (2003), online at http://bostonreview.net/BR28.2/
abou.html (visited Nov 21, 2009) (articulating Islamic conception of, and bases for, democracy);
Noah Feldman, After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democray 51-61 (2003) (outlining
possible forms of Islamic democracy).
Winter 2010
Delahunly and Yoo
Chicago Journal of International Law
political systems, then spreading democracy will not advance American national
security and could well be counter-productive. Defining democracy in a narrow
way in order to fit the data might make the lessons for real world security more
tenuous and even impractical. We need to understand the causal mechanism that
makes democracies less warlike with each other before we can link the national
security policy of individual states to Kant's larger goal of a league of democratic
republics.
The "empirical regularity" of the democratic peace thesis is critical to our
argument. Rigorous statistical analysis shows that democracies do not wage war
with other democracies. 107 There are several other important observations linked
to this fundamental finding. Democracies commonly fight wars with non-
democracies. Democracies win a disproportionate share of the conflicts with
non-democracies. Democracies settle disputes through peaceful dispute
settlement processes more often than others. Democracies are more likely to
initiate wars against non-democracies than vice-versa. Democracies fight shorter
wars with lower costs when they begin the wars. Transitional democracies are
more likely to fight, and larger democracies are less likely to go to war than
smaller ones. °8 Critics have questioned whether the findings are statistically
robust, or have argued that omitted variables such as the stability of the Cold
War are the true explanations." 9 Yet it appears that the democratic peace is as
close to a statistical law as anything will be in international politics.
Dispute continues, however, over the explanation for the democratic
peace. Some of the explanations bear directly on the relevance of the arguments
of Kant and Habermas. One school of thought argues that democracies share
certain norms for resolving conflicts domestically that they also bring to
international politics. Since democracies internally settle their disputes peacefully,
they will only use force in self-defense or, at times, to stop human rights
violators in other countries."' The leading scholar behind this argument,
Michael Doyle, drew his argument explicitly from Kant in his well-known article,
Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs."'
However, that form of Kantian explanation does not work because it is not
at all clear that democracies direct their peaceful norms outwards as well as
107 See, for example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et al, An Institulional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,
93 Am Pol Sci Rev 791 (1999).
108 Id at 791.
109 See, for example, Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, Common Interests or Common Polities?:
Reinteipreing the Democratic Peace, 59 J Pol 393 (1997) (arguing that the Cold War influenced most of
the stability between democratic states, rather than similar government structures).
110 Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legades, and Foreign Affairs at 25 (cited in note 5).
M Id at 26.
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inwards. As noted, democracies have often fought non-democracies, and many
of these wars have not been conflicts of self-defense-in fact, democracies
appear to initiate wars against non-democracies more often than the other way
round.1 2 This appears to be the case even when the opponent is not an
autocracy, but instead is a colony." 3 Nineteenth-century imperialism in Asia and
Africa was not an experiment in exporting democracy. Another claim based on
norms is that the leaders of democracies are more likely to trust and respect each
other to such an extent that they will avoid the use of threats and force and
instead rely on negotiation and peaceful dispute settlement. Again, it is not clear
whether the empirical evidence supports this mechanism. Democracies have
used covert action and force against other democracies-witness the US'
interventions against Iran in 1953 and Chile in 1973-even when they have been
great powers. Crises between the US, Britain and France have been resolved
without war, but not because they were unwifling to approach the brink of
114
war.
Institutional accounts for the democratic peace begin to draw us closer to a
confluence of national self-interest and international public good, though several
of them contain their own faults. However, they still depend, in part, on a
Kantian approach because they assume that democracies will contain certain
constitutional or political structures that will make them more peaceful by
nature. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, for example, argue that democratic
r6gimes make their leaders more accountable to groups in society that will
oppose war more often than not. 5 Elected leaders will not undertake costly,
unpopular, or dangerous wars because they will be ousted if they lose. Different
variations of this approach maintain that other features of democratic
government will make offensive war difficult. The importance of public opinion
places constraints on democratic leaders, because the public does not want to
suffer the costs of war" 6 while at the same time, interest groups that benefit
from peace and trade will also oppose war." 7 Autocrats are responsible, at best,
to a much narrower electorate. Separate institutional features of democracies,
which depend on their constitutional structure, also may explain the democratic
112 Scott D. Bennett and Allan C. Stam, The Declining Advantages of Democray: A Combined Model of War
Outcomes and Duration, 42 J of Conflict Resolution 344 (1998).
113 Sebastian Rosato, The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory, 97 Am Poll Sci Rev 585, 588-89
(2003).
114 Christopher Layne, Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace, 19 Intl Security 5 (1994).
115 Mesquita, 93 Am Poli Sci Rev at 793-94 (cited in note 107); see also Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
and Randolph M. Siverson, War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Political Analsis of
Regime Types andAccountabili y, 89 Am Pol Sci Rev 841 (1995).
116 Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principlesfor a Post Cold War World 38 (Princeton 1993).
117 Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs at 26 (cited in note 5).
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peace. Democracies make decisions in a slower, more transparent manner
because of public discussion in legislatures and multiple checks on authority.
This makes democracies slower to mobilize and less likely to launch successful
surprise attacks.'
These explanations, however, suffer from the same problem that besets the
argument that democracies apply the same norms to their external affairs as to
their internal ones. Institutional features of democracies should be present
regardless of the regime type of their opponent. These arguments tend to claim
that democracies are inherently more peaceful than non-democracies, and hence
when two democracies face off against each other, these characteristics will
interact to lower the chances of war virtually to zero." 9 But the empirical
evidence does not appear to support the claim that democracies are more
pacifistic; they have no difficulty waging war against autocracies, and appear to
do so more often than autocracies start wars against democracies.
12
A more promising direction is suggested by asking how the democratic
peace thesis fits into theories of why interstate wars occur in the first place.
Here, we make use of the political science literature on crisis bargaining.
121
Because war is so destructive, a point emphasized by Kant, rational nations with
complete information should prefer a negotiated settlement to war. Imagine, for
example, that the US and China have a dispute over the control of Taiwan.
China issues a threat to the US that it is willing to use force unless the US
removes its protections from Taiwan and allows its absorption by the mainland.
The US must decide whether to accede to China's demand or to resist with
force. Both the US and China have an expected value for going to war, which is
a function of the probability that each will win a war and the value of controlling
Taiwan minus the expected cost of fighting the conflict. If the US knows that
the expected value of controlling Taiwan is lower for China than the likely cost
of any US-China conflict, the US will not back down because it knows that a
rational China would not wage war. Likewise, if the US knows that the expected
value of controlling Taiwan's independence is higher to China than the likely
cost of war, it will give up its protection or reach some other negotiated
118 Mesquita, 93 Am Poli Sci Rev at 802-03 (cited in note 107); Kenneth A. Schultz, Domestic
Opposition and Signaling in International Cnses, 92 Am Pol Sci Rev 829, 840-41 (1998).
119 See David E. Spiro, The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace, 19 Intl Security 50, 62-65 (1994) (failing to
find a statistically significant different in the frequency of war between democracies and
autocracies).
120 See Mesquita, 93 Am Pol Sci Rev at 791 (cited in note 107).
121 See Fearon, Rationalist Explanationsfor War at 379-81 (cited in note 9); Robert Powell, Bargaining
Tbeogy and International Conflict, 5 Ann Rev Pol Sci 1 (2002); Kenneth A. Schultz, Do Democratic
Institutions Constrain or Inform?: Contrasting Tw'o Institutional Perspectives on Democray and War 53 Intl
Org 233 (1999).
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settlement. In both cases, both the US and China avoid the deadweight loss of
warfare, the only change being whether Taiwan remains within the sphere of
American protection or becomes part of China.
Several assumptions underlay this model. There must be a real probability
that either the US or China will win, and that both nations can estimate this
probability. Neither China nor the US is risk-seeking, in the sense that they
would gamble to win a low-probability victory. Additionally, Taiwan or the asset
in dispute can be bargained over and divided, rather than transferred as a whole,
though side payments, linked deals, or different spheres of influence.
This noncooperative bargaining model identifies two factors that can
produce war, even when both sides to the dispute are acting rationally. First,
incomplete information can cause nations to estimate important variables
incorrectly. For example, China may not know the US' expected value of going
to war. China may have an understanding of the value of Taiwan's independence
to the US, but the probability that the US would prevail in a conflict will depend
on several factors-its military and political capabilities, its diplomatic support,
the nature of Taiwan's armed forces-that could well be private information
known to the US. China might not know, for example, how many submarines
the US has deployed near Taiwan and how much damage it could inflict on any
invasion fleet. Conversely, the US may also have little information on the true
capability of Chinese armed forces in Taiwan, its abilities to control the sea and
air, and how much political support will exist for the invasion.
Democracies may do a better job of overcoming this information deficit
than autocracies by providing ways to send more costly signals to each other.
22
Nations can reveal private information to each other so as to reduce the chances
of conflict. A few problems stand in the way. A nation might feed misleading
information in the hopes of exaggerating its probability of winning (that is,
engage in strategic bluffing), or there may be so much publicly available
information in a democracy that it is too difficult to filter out the noise. 123 To
reveal private information credibly, nations can send a costly signal. A
democratic leader who issues a threat-say if President Obama were to declare
that the US would defend Taiwan with armed force-sends that signal more
credibly because he will incur domestic political costs if he does not follow
through. Elements of constitutional design can provide a method for making
signals even more credible. An executive branch that works for legislative
enactment of a war authorization bill can send a more credible signal than simply
opinion polls or speeches by opposition politicians supporting the President.
122 Jide Nzelibe and John Yoo, Ralional War and Constitutional Design, 115 Yale L J 2528 (2006).
123 Rosato, The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theor
'
at 599 (cited in note 113).
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There is a significant challenge for this theory, however. Just as critics have
argued that the norms-based and political constraints approaches do not seem to
hold in wars between democracies and non-democracies, the informational
theory we raise should also lead to reductions in wars between democracies and
opponents regardless of r6gime type. In the two American wars against Iraq in
1991 and 2003, the President went to Congress and received authorizations to
use force.124 The 1991 bill was particularly costly because it barely passed the
Senate, fifty-two to forty-seven, when Congress was under the control of the
opposition party. Yet, it does not seem that these signals convinced Saddam
Hussein to come back to the negotiating table to resolve his outstanding
disputes with the US. Autocrats may have difficulty filtering through all of the
information produced by the political system of a democratic opponent, and
may instead only pick and choose the information that supports their
preconceived views.'
25
Democracies might prove able to cut through the noise, but primarily only
with other democracies. Democratic leaders might be better able to filter
through the information produced by an opposing democracy because they
operate in similar political systems. They can distinguish between general data
involving military capabilities, opinion pieces by journalists and commentators,
and specific signals revealing private information sent by responsible
government officials. 126 This explanation is different from the norms theory. It is
not that democratic leaders extend their norms of behavior to other nations, but
that their democratic culture and upbringing allow them to understand the
signals that emerge from other democracies in a way that autocracies cannot.
These messages, once understood, can help avoid war by revealing private
information about the expected value of war.
Commitment problems pose a second obstacle to nations seeking a bargain
to resolve a dispute. Even if nations have full information about their
opponent's probability of prevailing in conflict, they still may be unable to reach
a bargain to head off war. Full information allows each party to identify the
acceptable range of outcomes for the other, and hence reach a resolution and a
distribution of the surplus. Instead, the problem is that neither party has
confidence that the other will perform its obligations without a supra-
124 See John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11 12, 155
(Chicago 2005).
125 Rosato, The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory at 599 (cited in note 113).
126 See Branislav Slantchev et al, Probabihlric Causalit, Selection Bias, and the Logic ofthe Democratic Peace,
99 Am Poli Sci Rev 459, 460 (2005).
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governmental enforcement mechanism.127 This is especially the case if the
division of the asset in dispute will give one side an advantage in resources in
any future conflict. Suppose, for example, that the US and China could settle the
Taiwan question by agreeing to a division of the island. Division would give
China a distinct military advantage in any future conflict by providing it with
additional resources and by lessening the tactical advantage of American naval
and air forces. The US cannot rely on China to take advantage of a relative shift
in resources in the future and wage war to take over the rest of the island. The
lack of an enforcement mechanism prevents the two nations from reaching a
negotiated settlement, even though they might have complete information about
the other side's expected value from conflict.
Democracies might be able to overcome this problem by using their
domestic constitutions to make credible commitments. The constitution could
divide authority over the international agreement, in which the participation of
other branches would be required to begin or end cooperation. The participation
of more than one branch in the making of the agreement would signal a greater
level of commitment by the political system. Requirement of approval by more
than one branch in termination reveals commitment by showing that higher
costs would accrue to end the agreement. If the US, for example, were to
undertake an international arms control agreement, Congress would have to
participate by authorizing the destruction of American weapons systems.
Likewise, the other nation would have more confidence that the US would not
breach the agreement because Congress would have to authorize any
construction of new weapons systems that might go beyond agreed upon levels.
As with signaling, democracies might be better able to understand whether
the domestic constitutions of other democratic nations may be able to produce
meaningful commitment. An autocrat, for example, may be unable to navigate
the alien constitutional design of a democratic opponent, or may simply be
unwilling to believe that the other branches of government could really block the
democracy's executive policy. Democratic leaders, by contrast, may better
understand another country's constitutional requirement of legislative
appropriations for military expansion or parliamentary approval for treaty
formation or termination.
It is important to understand how this mechanism for the democratic
peace is at odds with Kant's. Kant argued that democracies would be less likely
to make war because, as republics, they depended on popular consent for their
foreign policies. The people, in contrast to hereditary rulers, would be wary of
127 See, for example, Robert Powell, War as a Commitment Problem, 60 Intl Org 1 (2006); Robert
Powell, The Inedient Use of Power Costly Conflict with Complete Information, 98 Am Pol Sci Rev 231
(2004).
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conflict because of the high costs in lives and fortunes, the destruction resulting
from and the rebuilding necessitated by the conflict, and the national debts
incurred. This, however, does not explain the higher rate of wars between
democracies and autocracies, especially the fact that democracies tend to launch
wars against non-democracies rather than vice versa.
121
Our explanation relies on two different mechanisms, both rooted in the
theory that war arises because of a bargaining failure between two nations in a
dispute. The first is that democracies may have the ability, because of their
republican constitutions, to send costly signals that provide reliable information
to their opponents about their capabilities and willingness to fight. The second is
that democracies may be able to make more credible commitments by requiring
the consent of more than one branch of government before terminating an
international agreement. These mechanisms may function more effectively in
democracy-democracy dyads than democracy-autocracy dyads because
democratic leaders may be better able to interpret the signals sent, and
commitments made, by another democracy. A democracy may not make its
leaders more pacifistic than autocrats, but it may allow them to better
understand the abilities of democratic opponents, including their ability to
disable themselves from going to war.
If these arguments accurately explain the mechanisms behind the
democratic peace, then there may be firmer grounds for making democracy
promotion part of the national security strategies of the US and its Western
allies. We are not arguing that democracy promotion will automatically produce
a more peaceful world. If the democratic peace holds true, as well as its corollary
that democracies wage wars with autocracies at a regular pace, then whether the
world becomes more peaceful with the spread of democracy will depend, in part,
on the number of non-democracies in the world. If there are relatively few
democracies and many autocracies, war might well increase because the former
wage war against the latter more regularly. Nor does our argument here depend
on the claim, to which we are sympathetic, that the spread of democracy will
increase global welfare by spreading freedom and creating the conditions for
successful economic growth.
Instead, the democratic peace suggests that so long as the US remains a
democracy, it can successfully reduce threats to its security by promoting r6gime
change in its enemies. The great example remains, of course, the post-Second
World War experience with Germany, Japan and Italy. These nations formed the
Axis threat during the war, but the US and its allies transformed them into
democracies during the postwar period and they have remained trusted allies
128 See Zaov Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, Regime Types and International Conlict, 1816-1976, 33 J Conflict
Resolution 3, 17-26 (1989).
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ever since. At the time, the US had a selfish motive for its transformation of the
three nations. The start of the Cold War made it imperative that the US secure
allies in Europe and East Asia to help contain Soviet (and later, Chinese)
communism. The US not only promoted democracy on Germany and Italy, but
it recognized West German sovereignty and rearmament as part of the North
Atlantic Treaty Alliance-which also had the effect of containing Germany
too.12 9 When North Korea invaded the South, Japan became the forward base of
operations for the US military effort. 3 ° The US promoted democracy in
Germany, Italy and Japan, not because it was interested in the Kantian ideal of
creating a league of republics, but because it needed stable, friendly nations in
Europe and East Asia.
Kant's league of republics thus becomes a welcome by-product of the
pursuit of security by democratic nations. The US and its allies have an interest
in promoting democracies because this type of r6gime is less likely to pose a
national security threat to them in the future. They follow this policy for self-
interested reasons, not because they seek to add to global welfare generally. As
democracies spread, however, they will create a space of peace in their own
relations that will approximate Kant's league. That result, not necessarily
intended by the spreaders of democracy, will enhance global welfare.
Our account of the mechanisms behind the democratic peace has two
implications worth mentioning here. First, contrary to the account of Habermas,
international institutions may well hinder rather than help this process.
Habermas' mistaken extension of Kant grounds the spread of a Kantian peace
on the strengthening of international institutions such as the UN, which he
hopes will follow the growth pattern of the EU. Earlier, we argued that the UN
and other international institutions, as currently constructed, could not advance
the idea of a Kantian peace because of the powerful positions held by autocratic
(or at least questionably democratic) states in their governing structures. Non-
democracies hold two of the five permanent seats on the UN Security Council
and are well-represented on other international bodies such as the International
Court of Justice. Indeed, the democratic peace has gone on for long periods
without any meaningful international organizations at all (1814-1919, for
example), and we are unaware of any empirical studies that show that the
existence of the League of Nations or the UN has done anything to affect the
democratic peace.
International organizations may not just represent barren ground for a
democratic peace. They may even affirmatively retard progress toward Kant's
129 See Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
(Princeton 1999).
130 John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of WWII (Norton & Co 2000).
Winter 2010
Delahun_4, and Yoo
Chicago Journal of Internalional Law
goal. One reason is the UN Charter's strict regulation of the use of force. Article
2(4) of the Charter prohibits nations "from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."' 31 Article 51 conditions
the complete ban on the use of force against another state in cases of self-
defense: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security."' 3 2 Thus, the Charter creates a
system in which nations cannot use force except in self-defense or as authorized
by the Security Council. As one of us has observed earlier, these provisions seek
to drive the amount of force in international politics to zero, and attempt to
create a monopoly on violence in the supranational government of the Security
Council, much as the domestic legal system does with national governments.
133
The problem with this system is that the Charter's formal rules exclude
uses of force that would contribute to the spread of democracy and, hence, the
growth of a zone of peace among republics. To be sure, a coalition of nations
has supported a broader "responsibility to protect" doctrine to create a legal
basis for humanitarian intervention.' That principle would allow intervention
in cases where a government is committing systematic human rights abuses. In
2006, the Security Council even endorsed the responsibility to protect in a
resolution. 13 Nonetheless, the member nations of the UN have not amended
Articles 2(4) or 51 to recognize this new responsibility, which is therefore in
tension with the guarantee of territorial sovereignty at the heart of the Charter.
Perhaps more importantly, it is unclear that the UN can live up to its new
responsibility. The Security Council Resolution itself acknowledges that the
responsibility to protect will be enforced by collective action as authorized
through the regular channel of the Security Council. In any event, the
responsibility to protect does not address itself to whether a regime is
democratic or not, and would allow autocratic governments to rule so long as
humanitarian abuses ended.
An international system that took account of the working mechanisms
behind the democratic peace should expand the grounds for legitimate
intervention. It should also recognize greater flexibility for regime change during
the occupation of another country in the course of intervention. As currently
131 UN Charter Art 2(4).
132 UN Charter Art 51.
133 John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U Chi L Rev 729, 737 (2004).
134 Resolution 1674, UN Security Council, 5430th mrtg 4 (April 28, 2006), UN Doc S/RES/1674.
135 Id.
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conceived, the international law of occupation does not permit an occupying
country to change the governmental form or the laws of the occupied nation.
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, which formed one of the earliest
treaties on the laws of war, declares that an occupying power "shall take all
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country." 136 As further articulated in Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949, this principle allows an occupying power to alter domestic
laws-which would extend to governmental forms, we assume-when necessary
to maintain public order or protect the occupying power's own security.
37
Unless change in the governmental form meets these conditions, generally an
intervening power cannot engage in the regime change of a defeated nation to
favor democracy. The US and its allies, however, were able to change the
governing structure of Iraq because the regime of Saddam Hussein, as then
constituted, posed an ongoing threat to the safety of -he occupying forces, and
UN Security Council resolutions encouraged the US and Britain to promote
"representative government" there.'38 But Iraq represents the exception, rather
than the rule. If a Kantian peace is to be spread by democracies acting in their
own interests, international law should give them more freedom to plant the
seeds of republican government in nations that they occupy.
Our theory of the democratic peace carries a second implication, one
involving the types of regimes that the US and its allies should prefer. While
predicting the consequences of constitutional design is not easy,139 a democratic
nation may favor in the constitutions of other nations certain provisions that
would improve their ability to send costly signals and to make reliable
commitments. In the area of signals, a constitution could create multiple
channels to make foreign policy and national security decisions. Nations could
choose the more costly method when it wishes to send meaningful signals as
part of bargaining in an international dispute. To take an example from the US,
the President has waged war without congressional authorization sometimes (for
example, Korea), and with authorization at other times (for example, Iraq). It is
politically costly for the President to seek legislative authorization for war,
136 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, Art 43, 36
Stat 2277, 2306, TS No 539.
137 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6 UST 3516,
TIAS 365 Article 64 (1949). For the leading discussion of this issue, see Eyal Benvenisti, The
Internalional Law of Occupation 13 (Princeton 1993).
138 Resolution 1483, UN Security Council, 4761st mtg (May 22, 2003), UN Doc S/RES/1483. For
discussion of the legal basis for the Iraqi occupation, see John Yoo, Iraqi Reconstruction and the Law
of Occupation, 11 UC Davis J Intl L & Poly 7 (2004).
139 See Adrian Vermeule, Mechanisms of Democragy 25-55 (Oxford 2008).
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though the amount of those costs is a matter of degree depending, in part, on
whether Congress is controlled by the opposition party. If the President wishes
to send a meaningful signal about the willingness and capability of the US to go
to war, he can choose to go through Congress. If there is nothing to be gained
from such a signal, the President can still act on his own.' 40
With commitments, a constitution could disperse decision-making
authority over certain forms of international agreements between different
branches. A treaty requiring independently elected executive and legislative
branches to concur would represent greater commitment than, for example, a
treaty signed by a parliamentary government in which the majority party in the
legislature also controls the executive branch. A constitution that places
implementation of an international agreement in different branches may well
make it more difficult for a nation to withdraw from its international
commitments. The non-self-execution doctrine in American law, for example,
allows the President and Senate to make the treaty, but requires Congress to
implement provisions that require appropriations or changes in domestic law.
Once these spending decisions or regulations are enacted, the executive branch
cannot terminate them along with a treaty since they rest on Congress's
independent legislative authorities.14' Congressional-executive agreements bear
this same characteristic. Since Congress enacts them as legislation, the President
cannot terminate them unilaterally. '42
These examples are only meant to be suggestive, rather than definitive. We
only wish to highlight that the mechanisms of the democratic peace bear
important implications for constitutional design. The important point is that if
democracies do not wage war with each other because of their ability to send
signals or make commitments, then certain features of their constitutions and
political systems will perform those functions better than others. Nations that
spread democracy in order to enhance their security will have an interest in
promoting those constitutional features as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are two basic ways in which the Kantian project may be carried
forward. One way is Habermas': that of starting from existing international or
regional organizations such as the UN or the EU, and working for their
evolution into some form of globalized government. The other way is to work
140 See Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design (cited in note 122).
141 For discussion of this point, see John Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural
Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 Colum L Rev 2218 (1999).
142 See John Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 Mich L
Rev 757 (2001).
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forward from Kant's powerful insights into the possibility of a democratic peace.
Habermas' version of the project may well be truer to Kant's original thought,
but it seems likely to result in a world that risks being neither peaceful nor free.
The root problem in Habermas' highly institutionalized approach is that the
global governmental structures he envisages will lack real democratic
legitimization. The approach we advocate instead has the advantage, among
others, of "cutting with the grain." In promoting democratic government in
particular states, the world's leading democratic powers will be serving their own
security needs and, as a welcome by-product, producing the circumstances in
which respect for human rights and friendly relations between states are likely to
spread.
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